

Hill & Woolsey Fires After Action Summary Report



PUBLIC WORKS

FIRST RESPONDER

INCIDENT SUMMARY

From November 7 to November 22, 2018, Thousand Oaks was engaged in a mass shooting and two fires. This is an After-Action Summary Report (AASR) of three incidents that occurred over a 72-hour period. This AASR includes a three-day response timeline (page 4). This document also includes observations, recommendations for improvements and follow-up items that have been completed or will soon be completed. It is also important to note that this is a summary description of the more formal report that the city submitted to the Ventura County Sheriff Office of Emergency Services. Also included in this report is the EOC structure on page 14, a Hill/Woolsey Fire Boundary map and a Fire History map on page 16.

<u>Borderline Incident</u>	<u>Hill Fire Incident</u>	<u>Woolsey Fire Incident</u>
November 7 @ 2320 <ul style="list-style-type: none">☐ 12 Fatalities☐ 18 injured	November 8, 2018 @ 1403 <ul style="list-style-type: none">☐ 4,531 Acres Burned*☐ 4 Structures Destroyed☐ 2 Structures Damaged	November 8, 2018 @ 1424 <ul style="list-style-type: none">☐ 96,949 Acres Burned*☐ 1500 Structures Destroyed☐ 341 Structures Damaged

See Attachment 1 – Fire Boundary Map



SHELTERING

MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION

In past incidents, local shelter functions were fully assumed by the American Red Cross (ARC), but during this incident, the ARC representatives were not able to address all local sheltering needs, due to road closures and the resource requests in Los Angeles County. As a result, the City, Conejo Recreation and Park District (CRPD) and the Conejo Valley Unified School District (CVUSD) worked together to establish, staff, and fulfill all the local shelter needs in Thousand Oaks. One of the follow-up items from the incident is to update sheltering procedures between local agencies and to establish a countywide care and shelter plan. The County Human Services Agency has since made excellent progress on doing just that.

When the City Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated, many city employees were planning a vigil for the Borderline Incident. The details of the three incidents are further described below, but the four primary challenge areas related to the fires included: emergency staffing, care and shelter services, emergency communications, and water/wastewater operations. Each of these areas are summarized in this report.

AGENCIES	SHELTERING FACTS	SHELTERS
Conejo Valley Unified School District	Five Shelters, serving 3,000 people for four (4) days	Goebel Adult Center
Ventura County American Red Cross		Thousand Oaks Community Center
Conejo Recreation and Park District		Thousand Oaks High School
		Thousand Oaks Teen Center



Disaster Debris Update



Fire Status Briefing



Care & Shelter

BORDERLINE SHOOTING, HILL & WOOLSEY FIRE 3 DAY TIMELINE

0949 Red Flag Warning issued for Ventura County



- 1549 First Structure Fire Reported at Vallecito Mobile Home Park
- 1546 NB and SB Lanes Highway 101 are closed
- 1539 Woolsev Fire Consumes 600 acres
- 1520 City EOC Activated
- 1500 Emergency Shelter – Thousand Oaks Community Center Opened



November 7, 2018

2320 Borderline Mass Shooting

1237 Hill Canyon Treatment Plant on Back-up Power



November 8, 2018

0015 County EOC Activated

1403 Hill Fire ignited in Hill Canyon near Santa Rosa Valley

1424 Woolsey Fire ignited near Simi Valley

1430 City Declares Local Emergency

1445 Municipal Service Center Evacuated

1447 First VC Alert Issued for Hill Fire – Camarillo Springs Mandatory Evacuation

1449 Woolsey Fire Incident Command Post established at Rocketdyne

1449 Hill Fire Incident Command Post relocated to Camarillo

1431 Hill Fire Incident Command Post – Highway 101 at Camarillo Springs Road underpass

1605 Woolsey Fire Incident Command Post established at Fire Station 43

1630 Emergency & Animal Shelter Opens @ Borchard Community Center Shelter

1900 Large Animal Shelter Opens on Ventura County Fairgrounds

Woolsey Fire Consumes 2,000 acres

2245 Mandatory Evacuation Issues for Oak Park

2256 First Structure Fire reported in Oak Park

November 9, 2018

0001 – City declares a local emergency for the Woolsey Fire



INCIDENT CHALLENGES

Although the City worked effectively within Ventura County operational area in preparing and responding to the mass shooting, Hill and Woolsey Fires, the City did experience some unexpected challenges related to the fires. The four identified challenge areas include:

1. EOC TEAM STAFFING

INCIDENTS

- a. Most EOC positions were filled and EOC operated as expected during a four-day period and alternating 12-hour operational schedules.
- b. EOC city staff coordinated field support to traffic control, water systems operations, debris removal, and other tasks as needed, despite MSC being evacuated.
- c. City services were not interrupted during any of incidents despite areas of Thousand Oaks experiencing power outages, the loss of Spectrum cable services and KCLU radio transmission going down temporarily.

ACTION ITEMS

- a. Add depth to the City EOC chart by including additional backups for several positions and cross train staff to handle multiple positions.
- b. Ensure staff assigned to the EOC team has an enhanced knowledge of their role.
- c. Disaster Service Worker training should be highlighted in the new employee onboarding process and promoted internally.

2. CARE AND SHELTER SERVICES

INCIDENTS

- a. Due to several fire related emergencies and freeway closures in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties, ARC staff and resources could not get to Thousand Oaks. The City assumed the primary role and managed most shelters.

ACTION ITEMS

- a. Develop a countywide Care and Shelter Plan that defines the roles of all agencies in opening and managing shelters during a local emergency incident.
- b. May need to update and/or establish shelter facility agreements between the Cities, Districts, the American Red Cross and County Human Services Agency.

3. **EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS**

INCIDENTS

- a. Three meeting rooms double as an EOC when an emergency arises. The EOC is equipped with radio communications and a supply room of laptops, a wireless printer, hardlines phones with dedicated EOC lines, emergency management documents and forms, and other supplies.
- b. The EOC has several flat screen televisions and internal/external WIFI network access.
- c. The EOC team communicate with staff at the Municipal Services Center (MSC), Hill Canyon Wastewater Treatment Plan (HTCP), and in the field by cell phone use and group texting.
- d. The EOC team provided regular incident updates to City Council members. These updates included shelter status and street closure information. Incident updates are also posted on VCemergency.com and social media.

ACTION ITEMS

- a. Laptop issues, such as logging in was problematic. Purchase new laptops.
- b. WIFI issues, with intermittent connectivity. Verify WIFI access.
- c. Limited access to City network, upgrade where possible.
- d. Wireless printer not operating properly. Replace and add printer.
- e. DLAN not used. Update system.
- f. Hardline phones were used minimally, therefore sharing information between City and County Operational area was limited. Establish hardline phone first.
- g. The EOC radio communications system was not used, since phone communications remained in place.
- h. Although the public VC Alert system worked well, the City's internal database of the employee data for the system is not current resulting in several employees not receiving updates. Staff needs to update the internal VC Alert database and have system procedures in place.

4. WATER/WASTEWATER SYSTEM OPERATIONS

INCIDENTS

- a. Both the MSC and Hill Canyon Treatment Plan (HCTP) were threatened. The MSC had to be evacuated on November 8, at 1445 hours for approximately two hours.
- b. Due to several fire related emergencies and freeway closures in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties, ARC staff and resources could not get to Thousand Oaks. The City assumed the primary role and managed most shelters.
- c. The HCTP is a critical facility, so when power was lost at 1237 hours on November 8, onsite back-up generators had to be powered up and remained in use for five days. The MSC also operated on back-up power for about 24 hours. Power lines could not be accessed by SCE to make repairs until after the fire had subsided and it was deemed safe by them to check into the issue. SCE had also determined it had higher priority issues elsewhere.
- d. City staff sheltered in place at HCTP for a couple of hours until the fire was no longer a threat. After the fire passed, the Ventura County Fire Department (VCFD) escorted some City staff out of the area, while other critical staff remained on site to operate the facility on generator power. Staff was in constant contact with the City EOC Operations Chief in the EOC to confirm intentions to shelter in place.
- e. The MSC was evacuated Thursday, November 8th, at 1445 hours for approximately two hours. Field crews remained in the field with vehicles and equipment but were sent home when it was determined that access to the MSC would be compromised for the remainder of the afternoon. The Woolsey Fire came through the City Thursday night into Friday morning, causing power and communications outages that prompted crews to address City-owned water infrastructure. As a standard procedure, the City raises the water level of its reservoirs upon the receipt of a Red Flag Fire Warning. In this case, reservoirs were filled up to 80 - 85 percent of capacity. Crews manually checked reservoir levels and infrastructure through Saturday morning. The system was able to keep up with demand throughout the incident and system pressure was maintained. See Attachment #2 for Water Systems Map.
- f. Three reservoir sites (Grissom, Wilder, and Oak Brook) suffered communications damage and power outages. Water staff manually checked elevations and ensure adequate water levels were maintained. The Oak Brook level transmitter and other reservoir sites have since been repaired and are back on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system. Generators mounted on trailers were used at Lone Oak Pump Station, Wilder Pump Station, and Grissom Hydro Station.

- g. The hydro system at Grissom Reservoir lost power for approximately four hours early Saturday morning, November 10, and the pressure dropped to no less than 10 psi. An emergency diesel pump was automatically activated to maintain normal pressure, and emergency generators were brought in until SCE was able to repair their power lines seven days later.
- h. A total of four reservoirs (Lang Ranch, Wilder, Grissom, and Oak Brook) lost power and required emergency generators for temporary power. Power was restored at all reservoirs except for Grissom. An emergency generator was placed at Grissom for the next seven days until power was restored.



CITY WILDFIRE PLANNING EFFORTS

Over the past four decades, Thousand Oaks and the Conejo Valley have experienced several major fires that have consumed thousands of acres. They include the Hill Fire (1980) Dayton Canyon Fire (1982) Sherwood Fire (1985) Greenmeadow Fire (1983), Wildwood I Fire (1985) Camarillo Springs Fire (2013) Hill Fire (2018) Woolsey Fire (2018) and the Wendy Fire (2019). To further prepare the City for additional wildfires, staff has completed several wildfire planning meetings with the Ventura County Fire Department, Ventura County Sherriff's Department, Conejo Recreation and Park District, Conejo Valley Unified School District all the local water purveyors and the American Red Cross.

Since the November 2018 fires, the City has updated or replaced equipment in the EOC, purchased a new Traffic Control Equipment Trailer, updated emergency supplies and develop several emergency response and PSPS program procedures. Staff has also updated the City Emergency Operations Plan and an Employee Training plan. It's also important to note that the City infrastructure that was damaged in the Hill & Woolsey fires exceeded \$2 million. Thankfully, the City has been approved for approximately \$1.9 million in reimbursement through FEMA and CALOES.

CITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE OBSERVATIONS


	CHALLENGES	IMPACTED EOC SECTIONS
1. Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Create text groups in advance of next event. b. Section role responsibilities should be part of onboarding process with HRD. Each Department should have a preparedness, response and recovery checklist. c. The EOC Organization Chart needs to be expanded to include backup for the Management Liaison/EOC Coordinator position. Section Chief's or backup should attend all EOC briefings. d. Lack of security posed challenges for tracking people in and out of EOC, even with logging of staff. e. Expand access and use of forms including Preliminary Damage Assessment and Safety Assessment forms by placing on One Drive in addition to the hard copies already stored in the EOC. f. The recorded messages for each Department's main line should be changed and passwords should be the phone extension. g. The EOC log-in process needs to be revised. 	Management, Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance
2. Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Use template for City Council updates. Provide training to City Councilmembers on their roles during emergencies. Donation Management and Care and Shelter training are both areas that need to be addressed. b. Establish core committee briefing after a Red Flag warning is issued. Advisory alert sent to EOC staff and establish contact with County EOC, Los Angeles County Animal Control, Los Angeles County and the Ventura County ARC. c. City did not have GIS/mapping of the incident available. 	Management, Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance
3. Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. A significant number of personnel were not available due to freeway closures, location and/or evacuation orders. Additional staff need to be assigned to the EOC team chart to ensure enough personnel back-up is in place. 	Management, Operations, Planning, Logistics


	CHALLENGES	IMPACTED EOC SECTIONS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. VC Alert database was not current resulting in updates not reaching all employees at the start and end of the incident. Program and process for use of system needs to be updated and practiced on a regular basis. c. The City confidential phone list of employees and agencies was not the most current version resulting in additional time to contact key staff and agency support. d. Staffing changes and the operational period schedule should be noted well in advance of each operational period for all sections. 	
4. Equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. WIFI access was limited or slow. b. The use of cell phones for calling and texting was effective but had the EOC lost power to the hardline phones or cell phone coverage was lost, communications would have switched to radios. Additional traffic control equipment and portable generators are needed to assist with multiple road closures and power failures. c. An electronic EOC status or bulletin board for all info would be helpful. hot spots were provided by Library staff in the EOC; need thumb drives; need a color printer that can print 11" x 17"; need phone chargers, new laptops, and a TV satellite dish, should cable be lost. 	Management, Operations, Planning, Logistics
5. Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The EOC at City Hall was functional and so was the Department Operations Center (DOC) at the City MSC. b. Although impacted by fire and smoke, the HCTP and the City MSC, were able to maintain operations through most of the incident. c. Lack of in insulation/sealing room and constant flow of personnel going in and out of the EOC resulted in poor air quality in the room. 	Management, Operations, Logistics

STATE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE

Performance Assessments Questions		Comments
1.	Were procedures established and in place for responding to the disaster?	YES EOC operating procedures in place and posted.
2.	Were procedures used to organize initial and ongoing response activities?	YES
3.	Was the ICS used to manage field response?	YES
4.	Was Unified Command considered or used?	YES Public Works staff supported Police and Fire
5.	Was the EOC and/or DOC activated?	YES The EOC at City Hall and the DOC at the MSC were used.
6.	Was the EOC and/or DOC organized according to SEMS?	YES The EOC at City Hall utilized the SEMS structure and DOC worked under that structure
7.	Were sub-functions in the EOC/DOC assigned around the five SEMS functions?	YES
8.	Were response personnel in the EOC/DOC trained for their assigned position?	YES Refresher training needed as well as additional assigned staff to the EOC Team.
9.	Were action plans used in the EOC/DOC?	YES
10.	Were action planning processes used at the field response level?	YES
11.	Was there coordination with volunteer agencies such as the Red Cross?	YES The ARC response to the incident was delayed. City vs ARC roles in opening and managing care shelters overlapped and need to be clearly defined. City and CRPD provided the primary support to two local shelters and essential back-up support at the other three shelters.
12.	Was an Operational Area EOC activated?	YES
13.	Was Mutual Aid requested?	YES Portable showers
14.	Was Mutual Aid received?	NO Cal Lutheran University showers were made available.
15.	Was Mutual Aid coordinated from the EOC/DOC?	NO
16.	Was an inter-agency group established at the EOC/DOC level? Were they involved with the shift briefings?	YES Public Works Unit was represented.
17.	Were Communications established and maintained between agencies?	YES Communications was limited. A City representative in the County EOC would have helped improve communications.
18.	Was the public alert and warning conducted according to procedure?	YES
19.	Was public safety and disaster information coordinated with the media through the JIC?	NO Public Information was managed by the City from the Management Section.

CITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM





HILL & WOOLSEY FIRE OVERVIEW

Major Conejo Valley Fires, 1980 - Present

